Matthias STICKLER. “We, the expellees” [from our native land], “renounce all thought of revenge and retaliation” – The Charter of Stuttgart, of 5–6 August 1950, as a historical document

German politicians, including those performing the office of Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, have highly appreciated and continue to appreciate the Charter of the German Expellees. While the Charter is of crucial importance for the Federation of Expellees, there are, nevertheless, no scholarly analyses of how it came into being. The author describes how the German expellee organisations were formed in the first years after the war, how the Charter of the German Expellees itself was written and adopted and what role it performed. It combined the right to a native land with the renunciation of vengeance and revenge and also had the unity of Europe as its objective. It constituted part of the FRG society’s self-perception as a community of victims. At the same time, it was a declaration of reconciliation, which made it possible for the Federation of Expellees to maintain the strong, political and social position that it continues to hold today. In the chain of initiatives aimed at reconciliation between Germany and its eastern neighbours, the Charter was an important link.

Piotr MADAJCZYK. The Polish Bishops’ Letter of Reconciliation to the German Bishops, as assessed by the German Foreign Office

The history of the Polish Bishops’ Letter of Reconciliation to the German bishops, sent in the autumn of 1965, that is, in a very inopportune political climate, is now relatively well known and researched. What contributed to its being widespread, was the perception of it as a precursor of the Polish-German reconciliation, an initiative which, while not capable of having a real impact on Poland and West Germany in the 60s, pointed to alternative methods by which it could be carried out and distanced itself from retaining hostility as a basis for Polish-German relations and using the stereotype of a threat on the part of Germany in Polish domestic politics. The circumstances in which the Letter had been brought into being could be studied thanks to the opening of Polish archives after the fall of Communism. The article shows how the Letter was received by West German diplomacy, in terms, most of all, of an appraisal of the chances and opportunities in the international arena which could follow from such a reception. What was important from Bonn’s point of view was the setting of the controversies around the Letter in Poland in a wider context, namely, one of balancing the relationships between determinants rooted in domestic politics, the policy of Moscow and the East Block and that of the Vatican.

Wanda JARZABEK. The Schumann Formula against the backdrop of France’s policy on post-war territorial status in Europe

France aempted to be consistent in the assertion of her entitlements resulting from her role as one of the four powers responsible for Europe. Franco-German relations in the power-war years were not easy; however, after President Charles de Gaulle and Chancellor Konrad
Adenauer signed the Elysee Treaty, attempts were made aimed at a rapprochement at the social contacts’ level; the political dialogue was also being developed. France also attempted to build up its position in the East. The return to tradition was impossible because of regime transformations in Central and East Europe; in the case of relations between Poland and France, however, French politicians referred to the past, comparable historical experience and a number of apprehensions regarding Germany’s intentions. France was, actually, comfortable with the post-war reduction of Germany’s territory; it was thus de Gaulle’s declaration of 29th March, to the effect that Germany’s unification will be possible within the borders of the existing German states which became the mandatory position for the French policy which Paris used to remind not only Polish, but also German politicians. A formula suggested in May 1970 to Poland’s Foreign Minister, Mr Stefan Jędrzychowski, by the French Minister, Mr Maurice Schumann, envisaged a joint declaration by the Four Powers and the submitting on their part of an assurance that they would support the invariable character of the border on the Oder–Lusatian Neisse rivers’ line, in accordance with a proviso set down in the Polish-German treaty. The idea of such a declaration was inconvenient to the People’s Republic of Poland, which did not wish the rights of the Powers to be given publicity and neither did it suit the Federal Republic of Germany, which did not wish such a declaration to be issued.

Tytus JASKUŁOWSKI, “The work is time-consuming, monotonous and it does not produce any specific results”. The Stasi’s intelligence monitoring in the Polish People’s Republic in 1980–1981, against the background of the MSW-MfS co-operation

The text attempts to analyse the GDR Ministry of State Security’s offensive operations using the instruments of radio-electronic intelligence against the PPR in 1981. The situation in Poland, the emergence of Solidarność and possible, uncontrolled spreading of a wave of democratisation onto the East Germany’s territory as well, drove the leaders of the latter state to undertake actions aimed at ensuring it access to information on the on-going situation in the PRP. Apart from the data obtained officially, they also intended to resort to independent methods for its acquisition, most of all by employing the secret services. The author focuses on just one aspects of such operations, that is, radio-electronic intelligence. Apart from describing the structure and the working methods of the MfS’ III Directorate responsible for this type of reconnaissance, he presents the guidelines received by this organisation, its modus operandi and forms of work both on the territory of the GDR and the PPR, as well as on that of the other states. He also points to the effects and all the problems resulting from implementing intelligence operations, including those in the context of official co-operation between the secret services of the PPR and GDR. According to the author, the manner of carrying out offensive MfS operations by radio-electronic intelligence allows for a certain scepticism with regard to the thesis that the GDR services had unlimited opportunities to work in Poland. Based on the available archive sources, the observation that the MIS found it difficult to process and apply information obtained as a result of the services’ operations, is warranted. The shortage of competent staff can be clearly seen and not all the available technical instruments could perform their role. What was also important was the lack of understanding at the MfS of the different philosophy of life in the PPR, which determined the reception of its image obtained from the monitoring in place. Moreover, archive searches provide circumstantial evidence indicating that the Polish counter-intelligence was aware of what type of operations were being carried out by the GDR against Poland. The need for cooperation between the MfS and the MSW in the context of the radio-electronic intelligence against other states, as well as the awareness of the risk related to the possible discovery of
illegal radio-electronic operations, led to their closing down. This failed, however, to change the belief that the fundamental operating principles of the secret services are to distrust one’s partners and to protect one’s own interests.

**Joanna SZYMONICZEK, International humanitarian and development aid as the instruments of German foreign politics**

As far as both humanitarian and development aid are concerned, Germany is a major donor. Involvement in such activity is aimed most of all at building up Germany’s strong position in the international arena, creating a positive image of Germany’s presence abroad, gaining in influence on the formation of a specific world view and of attitudes in the social, political and moral spheres in the recipient countries, and obtaining tangible financial, political and economic benefits. Support from Germany flows to victims of disasters and catastrophes, forgotten armed conflicts and alarming humanitarian problems. To any appeals for assistance, Germany reacts extremely fast. This is possible because of a very efficient system established in the country, comprised of public institutions and non-governmental organisation and with its operations in the international arena regulated in a series of documents. What is characteristic of German aid is the speed with which it arrives to the aggrieved, its adequacy and its subordination to political objectives, particularly in cases of providing aid in armed conflict situations. The fact that Germany is involved, most of all, in bilateral aid operations, which makes it possible to make decisions on her own as to whom to provide with assistance and how, and where, and that, moreover, such assistance is not anonymous, as is the case with the multilateral aid provided by international organisation, which is both more efficient and preferred by its recipients, is evidence of such policy.

**Adam JAROSZ, The European Union’s role in the Baltic Pipeline controversy. Comments in the Polish and German press**

The Baltic Pipeline turned out to be a controversial undertaking from the start of its implementation. The main role in this was played by the media, which bestowed publicity on the problem and, in particular, on the apprehensions provoked by this project. A very important role in this matter was performed by the European Union. It happened thus because practically all the states involved in the controversy were members and, as such, referred to its institutions in a empting to block the project. The EU’s role also had its second layer. Throughout, the parties involved in building the pipeline emphasised the European character of the project, which was to serve all the member states. This article aims at describing the debate in the press which was held in Poland and in Germany and at presenting what was written about the role of the European Union in the dispute around the Baltic Pipeline and in what context.

The main issue described in the press turned out to be the European Energy Charter, which Russia was unwilling to ratify. This document was to provide the European energy companies with access to the Russian gas market, which was regarded, both in Poland and in Germany, as one of the measures helping to improve Europe’s energy security. Another issue under consideration turned out to be the unity of the EU member countries as far as energy is concerned; something which was not easy to obtain. The Baltic Pipeline as a project was not interpreted uniformly. The Polish press perceived in the EU institutions an opportunity to torpedo it. The German media presented the pipeline as part of a European system, capable of improving the energy security for the entire continent.
An idea of a common energy policy also emerged in the EU; it was not, however, faced with unity among its members. The Polish press referred to a Three Musketeers’ one for all, all for one principle, which was to be implemented by the UE’ states’ supplying raw materials from their reserve stocks in a case of the interruption of supplies to one of the members. The German media, however, were cool toward the idea. The Polish government went a step further in this debate and suggested the formation of an energy NATO, to include the US into their co-operation as well. This suggestion was not appreciated, however, among German politicians and the media. The latter promoted a concept of energy co-operation along the OSCE lines and deemed a NATO-like approach as too confrontational toward Russia

Kinga SCHLESINGER. *Preventing right-wing extremism and countering it, as exemplified by Germany*

The article scrutinises the issue of right-wing extremism in Germany in recent years. The analysis leads to the conclusion that this problem is gathering in force in the UE while in Germany it is tending to diminish. The anti-extremism actions undertaken in Germany are so significant that they may provide a sui generis model for the other EU states and the European Commission to follow. The article describes, how right-wing extremism is prevented and countered, in particular as exemplified by Germany. Anti-extremist actions are carried out with regard to various entities and in various fields, namely, legislation, justice, administration, education, the media and NGOs. The article provides a review of anti-extremism strategies applied by the state bodies to the extreme right-wing parties, from marginalising them, in the case of Germany, to accepting them into ruling coalitions, in the case of Austria. The author’s considerations lead her to the conclusion that the main target groups in anti-extremist actions should be the youth and journalist.